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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
same vicinity may be received on direct examination of an expert on value as
a criterion in evaluating the land in controversy. 8
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, unanimously affirmed the decision
of the Appellate Division. They held that the sale prices of the land to the
promoters and the subsequent resale to the co-operative corporation in which
the promoters had no equity, was an indication of the value of the premises.
The builder of the co-operative was not compelled to buy unless he chose to
do so on account of the advantage of the location. It is not to be expected
that a prospective builder would pay more than necessary for the purchase
of suitable land and the fact that the corporation was able to sell the co-opera-
tive to the tenant owners at a price high enough to secure a profit indicates
that the land and buildings were adapted to the site and worth what they cost
when they were acquired and constructed.
There are many variables in the assessing process which make the determina-
tion difficult and controversial. Assessors are commonly directed to seek the
price that the property would command in a voluntary arms length sale. The
assessor's in the instant case did exactly that and the Court upheld their de-
termination. Under New York State Tax Law, Section 8,9 assessment of
realty for tax must be at the actual value of the property to the taxpayer.
The price he was willing to pay was surely an indication of the actual value
and could be used as the basis for determining real estate assessments.
WFEN CONSTRUCTION Is COMMENCED UNDER NEW YORK CITY
ADIWisTRATIvE CODE
The New York City Administrative Code contains the following provision:
"A building in course of construction, commenced since the preceding twenty-
fifth day of January and not ready for occupancy on the twenty-fifth day of
January following, shall not be assessed unless it shall be ready for oc-
cupancy or a part thereof shall be occupied prior to the fifteenth day
of April."'10 As a result, builders have a fifteen month tax exemption, a
period calculated to coincide with the time in which the building would not be
producing income.
In Sutton-53rd Corp. v. Tax Commission of New York City," plaintiff
made objection to the Tax Commission's assessment of $3,875,000 on his
property and improvement on the grounds that $3,000,000 of said amount was
exempted under the above-quoted provision. It was undisputed that plain-
tiff's building was not ready for occupancy until April 18, 1952. The issue
was whether construction had commenced prior, or subsequent to, January 25,
8. Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 N.Y. 231, 90 N.E.2d 53 (1949).
9. New York State Tax Law § 8:
All real property subject to taxation shall be assessed at the full value thereof.
10. § 157-1.0.
11. 7 N.Y-2d 416, 198 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1960).
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1951. If the former, the Tax Commission's assessment would stand. If the
latter, plaintiff would be exempted.
The uncontested evidence was that the following steps had been completed
prior to the status date, January 25, 1951. The site had been excavated.
Certain areas in the excavation, designated pier holes, had been chipped out to
expose the bedrock. The next step, pouring of concrete into the pier holes, had
also been partially completed (ninty-eight of two hundred and fifty).
The plaintiff insisted that these "piers", as the pourings were called, were
not for the purpose of erecting a foundation, but were placed to protect the
bedrock from the effects of the elements. However, it was also true that the
piers were the resting place of concrete forms called pedestals. The pedestals
transferred the weight of the building to the bedrock, through the intermediate,
the piers.
The question thus presented to the Court was whether the pouring of the
piers amounted to commencement of construction as the Commission contended,
or a mere preliminary. Special Term found for the plaintiff and the Appellate
Division affirmed.' 2 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that for the pur-
poses of this statute construction commenced upon the introduction and use
for construction purposes, of material foreign to the soil which eventually be-
comes a part of the completed improvement. In this case, placement of ninety-
eight of two hundred and fifty concrete piers was considered commencement
as a matter of law.
The test which the Court applied was first announced in 1915, in the case
of People ex rel. New York Central & H. R.R. Co. v. Purdy," where the Court
adopted the dissenting opinion of Scott, J. at the appellate level.14 Since that
decision and until the present case, only once has there been an instance where
the facts called for invocation of the test.'5 In all three cases there was latitude
for dispute as to what act in the building process constituted a commencement
of construction. There was, therefore, an obvious necessity for a yardstick. The
one which the Court has adopted is both reasonable and practical. It is
reasonable because it denotes as the starting point the raising of the building
from the ground. It is easily applied because it searches for one affirmative act.
Finally, the statute involved has been amended in language, but not in sub-
stance, since the earlier decisions. There being no change made to define "in
the course of construction," it would seem to be a sound assumption that the
judiciary's test was found satisfactory.
The lone dissent argued that this was not such a clear case as would justify
a holding, as a rmatter of law, that construction had commenced, and since
12. 8 A.D.2d 791, 188 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1959).
13. 216 N.Y. 704, 111 N.E. 1097 (1915).
14. 167 App. Div. 637, 153 N.Y. Supp. 300 (1st Dep't 1915).
15. Shelton Holding Corp. v. Goldfogle, 220 App. Div. 451, 221 N.Y. Supp. 583 (1st
Dep't 1927).
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there were questions of ultimate fact, the lower court's decision should be
affirmed.
CO NIIST PARTY NOT AN EMPLOYER UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANcE LAW
The refusal of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to honor a
claim for Unemployment Insurance gave rise to one of the most unusual cases
in the history of the courts of New York, an unsuccessful suit by a taxpayer
for the privilege of paying an excise tax, In re Albertson's Claim.'6
In this consolidated proceeding the Industrial Commissioner of New York
State as administrator of the Unemployment Insurance Law, Albertson, the
claimant, and Albertson's former employers, the Communist Parties of the
U. S. A. and of New York were all parties.
In March, 1957, the registration of the Communist Party as an "employer"
under the New York Unemployment Insurance Law' 7 was suspended and no
further payments were accepted from the Party.
Following earlier employment with the Communist Party, 8 Albertson lost
his job in a delicatessen and applied for benefits under the New York Unem-
ployment Insurance Law.
Albertson was not employed by the Communist Party at the time
of its suspension as an employer. The Industrial Commissioner decided that,
since the status of the Communist Party as an "employer" under the Unem-
ployment Insurance Law had been revoked by the Federal Communist Control
Act of 1954,19 the claim for benefits by Albertson was to be rejected since he
could not qualify as an ex-employee of a bonafide "employer," although his
employment had terminated before the formal suspension of the Party.
Albertson appealed this decision and the Communist Party appealed from
the determination that they were no longer to be treated as employers within
the definition of the Unemployment Insurance Law.2 The Appellate Division
reversed both decisions and the controversy came before the Court of Appeals
upon the appeal of the Industrial Commissioner as administrator of the Un-
employment Insurance.21
The Court of Appeals held that the fact that Albertson had spent the
time required to qualify for unemployment insurance as an employee of the
disqualified Communist Party was not enough to bar his claim. The Court of
Appeals, however, upheld the refusal of the Industrial Commissioner to treat
the Communist Party as an "employer" and his refusal to accept payment of
the tax to the unemployment fund.
16. 8 N.Y.2d 77, 202 N.YS.2d 5 (1960).
17. N.Y. Labor Law Art. 18.
18. It never appears in the record of this case that Albertson was a member of the
Party itself, or served it in any but a minor capacity.
19. 50 U.S.C. §§ 841, 842.
20. N.Y. Labor Law § 512.
21. 8 A.D.2d 918, 187 N.Y.S.2d 200 (3d Dep't 1959).
